USA v. James Blakney by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-10-2014 
USA v. James Blakney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. James Blakney" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 277. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/277 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3282 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES BLAKNEY, 
                             Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-11-cr-00562-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
___________                         
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 6, 2013 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 11, 2014) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 James Blakney appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court convicting 
him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 
and sentencing him to a 180-month term of incarceration.  Blakney contends the District 
Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearms evidence, and in determining 
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that he should be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
1
  
Finding no error, we will affirm. 
I. 
Blakney was arrested on June 4, 2011 after the police recovered two firearms 
hidden behind a toilet in Blakney’s home.  The police found the firearms while executing 
a search warrant.  A grand jury later charged Blakney, who had previously been 
convicted of a felony, with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1).   
Blakney moved to suppress the firearms evidence, arguing that the search warrant 
was issued on the basis of false material statements contained in the affidavit of probable 
cause.  The District Court held a hearing on Blakney’s motion.   
At the hearing, Terence Sweeney, a detective with the Philadelphia Police 
Department, testified that he sought the search warrant after interviewing seventeen-year-
old M.P., Jr. (“M.P.”) on June 2, 2011.  According to Detective Sweeney, M.P. reported 
that he had been the victim of an assault by two men on May 31, 2011.  M.P. stated that, 
during the assault, he was struck several times on the head with a nickel-plated handgun 
by a man he had known for several years by the name, “Bruce.”  As a result of the 
                                              
1
 In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) provides: 
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title 
and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in 
section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious 
drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from 
one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years. . . . 
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assault, M.P. was admitted to a hospital intensive care unit.  Detective Sweeney 
corroborated the fact that M.P. had been admitted to the hospital with severe head 
injuries. 
Detective Sweeney also testified that he checked the police radio database and 
found that the police had received a phone call reporting a disturbance at the time and 
location that M.P. claimed he had been assaulted.  The report was ultimately listed as 
“unfounded,” which Detective Sweeney interpreted as meaning that “when the officers 
responded no one came forth and offered the officers information for the alleged call.”  
(Appendix (“A.”) 24.)   
Additionally, Detective Sweeney testified that M.P. provided “Bruce’s” address to 
him, and that voter registration records listed Blakney as a resident of that address.  After 
running Blakney’s name through police records, Detective Sweeney learned that Blakney 
had a prior conviction that prevented him from legally possessing a firearm.  Sweeney 
then presented M.P. with a photograph of Blakney, and M.P. identified the photograph as 
the man he knew as “Bruce.”  (A. 14-15.)  M.P. then signed the photograph and wrote at 
the bottom, “[t]his is Bruce that [sic] hit me a number of times with a nickel-plated gun.”  
(Id. 15.)   
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the District Court found that the 
search warrant was supported by probable cause; that the affidavit of probable cause was 
free of any false statements or omissions material to the finding of probable cause; and 
that the affidavit of probable cause was free of any material false statements made 
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knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly.  Accordingly, the District Court denied the 
suppression motion. 
Blakney subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea 
agreement that called for a prison term of 180 months.  The plea agreement, although 
containing an appellate waiver, preserved Blakney’s right to challenge the denial of his 
suppression motion and his qualification for sentencing as an armed career criminal under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  At sentencing, Blakney challenged the government’s contention that 
he qualified as an armed career criminal subject to the mandatory minimum prison term 
of 15 years called for by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  Specifically, Blakney argued that the 
original certified copy of his 1995 robbery conviction, which the government produced at 
sentencing as evidence of a third qualifying felony conviction, was insufficient proof of 
that conviction.  The District Court disagreed, finding that the certified copy established 
that Blakney was convicted of the qualifying offense.  The District Court accepted the 
binding plea agreement and sentenced Blakney to 180 months’ incarceration in 
accordance with that agreement.
2
   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
Blakney first contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the firearms because the affidavit of probable cause was inadequate.  He relies 
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 Blakney’s advisory imprisonment guidelines range was calculated to be 210 to 
262 months. 
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on Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which “requires suppression of evidence 
obtained pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of a false statement that was both 
material to the finding of probable cause and made either knowingly and intentionally or 
with reckless disregard for the truth.”  United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 641-42 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).  Blakney concedes that Detective 
Sweeney did not knowingly or intentionally include a false statement in the affidavit.  
Thus, his argument succeeds only if he demonstrates that the affidavit included a false 
statement made “with reckless disregard for the truth,” and that the false statement was 
“necessary to the finding of probable cause.”  See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. 
When considering a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the 
district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we exercise plenary review over the 
court’s application of the law to the facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  The District Court’s determination that Detective Sweeney did not act with 
reckless disregard for the truth is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review for 
clear error.  See Brown, 631 F.3d at 642 (“[A] district court’s resolution of the question 
whether a particular false statement in a warrant affidavit was made with reckless 
disregard for the truth is subject to reversal only upon a finding of clear error.”).   
Blakney contends that the affidavit of probable cause was problematic for two 
reasons.  First, Blakney asserts that M.P.’s allegations – which formed the basis of the 
affidavit – were unreliable because M.P. was only seventeen years old at the time, and he 
“appeared nervous and apprehensive.”  (Appellant’s Br. 9.)  Second, Blakney asserts that 
the affidavit failed to disclose that the officers who responded to an initial radio call 
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about the incident marked the call “unfounded,” and that this omission was material.  (A. 
24.)   
  Blakney’s arguments fail for several reasons.  His assertion that Detective 
Sweeney acted with reckless disregard for the truth in failing to conduct further 
investigation into M.P.’s allegations is belied by the record.  Detective Sweeney testified 
before the District Court that he verified M.P.’s statements by reviewing M.P.’s hospital 
discharge papers and calling the hospital to confirm that M.P. had been admitted to the 
intensive care unit with severe head injuries.  He likewise confirmed that Blakney was 
known to M.P. as “Bruce” and that Blakney lived at the address provided by M.P. as 
“Bruce’s” residence. 
Blakney’s claim that the warrant would not have been issued if it had indicated 
that the police radio call was categorized as “unfounded” is unpersuasive.  Detective 
Sweeney testified before the District Court that the police report was designated 
unfounded because, “when the officers responded[,] no one came forth and offered the 
officers information for the alleged call.”  (A. 24.)  Based on this testimony,  the District 
Court did not clearly err in concluding that the omission of this information was 
immaterial. 
 Finally, Blakney’s brief fails to address the second prong of the Franks analysis; 
i.e., whether the allegedly false information was necessary to a finding of probable cause.  
Blakney’s brief does not identify a specific statement that is allegedly false, and the 
omission of the report being “unfounded” is immaterial to a finding of probable cause.  
We will therefore uphold the District Court’s denial of Blakney’s motion to suppress. 
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 Blakney also contends that the District Court erred in sentencing Blakney as an 
armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because the government failed to 
move the certified copy of Blakney’s 1995 robbery conviction into the record.  We need 
not address this issue at length.  Blakney does not deny that the certified copy of this 
conviction was accurate, nor does he argue that this prior robbery conviction fails to 
qualify for § 924(e)’s sentencing enhancement.  Furthermore, Blakney does not cite to 
any authority for the proposition that the District Court may only consider documents 
entered into evidence at sentencing.  Thus, we reject his argument that the District Court 
erred in relying on the certified copy of Blakney’s 1995 robbery conviction because the 
government failed to move the document into evidence. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
